



Policy Paper

Beyond Ceasefires-On-Paper: It's Time to End All Israeli Hostilities in Lebanon



Introduction

Despite the announcement (and then extension) of a ceasefire agreement, Israeli attacks on Lebanon have continued unabated and Israeli forces continue to expand their occupation in southern Lebanon, as well as widening the range of Lebanese towns impacted by forced displacement orders, aggravating the rate of displacement across the country.

The number of people killed by Israeli attacks has continued to rise, with at least 380 individuals reportedly killed in less than a month since the onset of the ceasefire¹. The total number of people killed since early March alone has reached 3,711, including 247 children and 132 health sector workers, whereas the number of people injured has reached 11,483, including 983 children and 393 health sector workers.

This is not the first case where Israel has been reported to have breached a ceasefire agreement, with similar patterns documented across the region, particularly in Gaza and previously in Lebanon after the 2024 ceasefire agreement.

However, it's important to note that violations are not limited to military operations and occupation, but extended to a range of other activities as well, including but not limited surveillance-related activity, inflammatory rhetoric, and other actions that undermine civilian protection and prospects for a sustained end to hostilities.

This policy paper lists some of the ongoing hostilities that need to stop, be it because they represent direct harm to Lebanon's population or because they represent some of the drivers of why cycles of violence continue to take place. Addressing these hostilities is a necessary component of ensuring agreements to end hostilities are sustainable and well-respected. The paper draws on Oxfam programmatic and security data from Oxfam, desk research, and two expert interviews: one with digital rights organization SMEX to analyze violations related to surveillance and digital platforms, and the other with Embrace, a mental health organization in Lebanon to assess the impact of the continuation of current hostilities on the general Lebanese public.

Another Meagre Ceasefire: A Look at the November 27, 2024 Ceasefire Agreement:

¹ <https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1506609/israeli-strikes-kill-at-least-380-people-in-lebanon-since-start-of-cease-fire-according-to-health-ministry.html>

On November 27, 2024, a ceasefire agreement had come into effect² after several months of extreme escalation in Israeli attacks that saw around 4,000 people killed in Lebanon and 16,520 others injured according to the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, whereas 60 Israeli soldiers were killed and 900 others were injured according to Israeli government estimates.

Among the agreement's 13 clauses, the first stated that both countries would implement a cessation of hostilities and the twelfth stated that Israeli forces would withdraw from Lebanese territories within 60 days.

However, shortly after its announcement, Israeli attacks and other reported breaches continued. Such attacks took place across areas in southern Lebanon, whereas Israeli forces occupied five positions within Lebanese territories. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the Lebanese government reported more than 15,400 ceasefire violations by Israeli forces, with more than 370 people killed between the ceasefire agreement's onset and February 2026³. Throughout that period, the Israeli army also continued to issue forced displacement orders for residents of southern Lebanese villages with no retaliation from actors in Lebanon. On March 2, Hezbollah launched rockets towards northern Israel, after which large scale hostilities resumed.

Ongoing Attacks, Occupation, and Forced Displacement Orders

Military Operations

In less than a month since the onset of the last ceasefire agreement in April 17, 3,318 ceasefire-related violations were recorded across Lebanon between April 17 and May 11, in addition to 2,324 airspace violations according to the Lebanese government's National Council for Scientific Research (CNRS). Lebanon's Information Ministry also highlighted that 47 Lebanese military and security personnel have been killed since March 2⁴.

In the week after the agreement on April 17, 2026, Oxfam in Lebanon's security team, cross-checking open-source information including INSO reports, UNDSS reports, and other

² <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-48-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-28-november-2024>

³ <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/msf-update-southern-lebanon-where-ceasefire>

⁴ According to the numerous ceasefire agreements announced so far, a constant given was that the Lebanese Army should take control of areas after both Israeli forces and Hezbollah withdraw from them. The killing and destruction of Lebanese military and security personnel thus represent attacks on the personnel mandated to maintain peace and security.

<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260609-lebanon-says-israel-committed-3491-ceasefire-violations-since-17th-april/>

sources, and direct observations by staff, identified hundreds of Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon (this figure is not exhaustive and largely reflects areas where Oxfam operates and major security incidents)⁵. These security developments had major impacts on Oxfam's operation and staff well-being, with eleven staff members displaced and having suffered from direct damages on their residential buildings. These incidents, collected until May 14, include:

- At least 190 airstrike operations, 80 shelling operations, and 45 drone strike operations (by operations, this could mean multiple simultaneous strikes at the same time).
- **Oxfam also identified 54 cases in which Israeli army engineers or other personnel reportedly planted explosives, blew up, or set fire to houses, buildings, or neighborhoods in southern Lebanon, contributing to a pattern of destruction of civilian and civilian infrastructure.**
- Oxfam was able to identify five instances where white phosphorus – a highly toxic substance with both short-term and long-term consequences on human, animal, and land well-being – was shelled or used. Rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch have stated that Israel's use of white phosphorus in populated areas violated international humanitarian law⁶.
- Furthermore, there were two instances where Israeli forces blocked roads to southern Lebanese towns with dirt and rubble, which likely impeded southern residents' journey to check on their houses after the announcement of the ceasefire agreement. One remnant explosive detonated in a southern town as well, with the number of casualties not yet confirmed.

⁵ The security and safety team communicates with Oxfam staff members via a common Whatsapp channel, given it's the most widely used communication app, to deliver the latest security updates.

⁶ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/09/lebanon-israel-unlawfully-using-white-phosphorus>




Figure 1: Footage from Satellite Company Airbus Used in CNN Article "The Gaza playbook: Satellite images reveal scale of Israeli destruction in Lebanon " – <https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/24/middleeast/lebanon-destruction-israel-gaza-model-intl-cmd>

Continued and Expanded Occupation

As of June 2026, Israeli forces continue to expand their occupation in southern Lebanon. The occupation includes a 5-10km-deep strip of land, amounting to about 5% of Lebanon's territory, or over 500 square kilometers⁷.

Furthermore, the Israeli army attacked approximately another one hundred towns, villages, or cities, in addition to back-to-back forced displacement orders since the onset of the ceasefire agreement, whereby the Israeli army threatened people to leave their areas of residence⁸.

⁷ <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgz5rgv4n3o>

Israeli occupation continues to expand on a continuous basis, including the day of the writing of this document.

⁸ It's difficult to estimate the total number of people displaced from such areas, primarily because population censuses are outdated in a large portion of Lebanese towns or villages. Estimation by governorate could also lead to inaccuracies due to the fact that not entire governorates are under occupation or forced displacement orders, but rather large portions of them. With this being said, hundreds of thousands of individuals are estimated to have their communities either occupied or under recurrent bombardment and/or forced displacement orders.



Figure 2: Forced Displacement Order in Gaza



Figure 3: Forced Displacement Order in Lebanon⁹

Two months after the ceasefire agreement, around one million individuals remain displaced¹⁰, with many in informal arrangements and only a small portion in collective shelters. Individuals still cannot return to their communities due to continued attacks, occupation, access restrictions and other reported violations to 134,800 as of June 8, 2026¹¹.

At Oxfam in Lebanon alone, eleven staff members remain forcibly displaced a month after the ceasefire agreement, whereas one member's house was extensively damaged as a result of a strike nearby¹².

Damage to Infrastructure and Inaccessible Community Centers

Attacks on residential and other civilian infrastructure have also continued after the ceasefire agreement. Between April 17 and May 8 only, over 18,228 residential units were completely destroyed (8,086) or partially damaged (10,142) according to CNRS¹³. The total number of residential units completely or partially destroyed between March 2 and June 8 was identified at 77,935¹⁴. This comes on top of 230, 436 residential units either destroyed

⁹ Both of these forced displacement orders came after ceasefire agreements in Gaza and Lebanon.

¹⁰ <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-36-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-18-june-2026>

¹¹ <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-33-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-8-june-2026>

¹² Many others fully or partially lost their houses, but this was before the ceasefire agreement.

¹³ https://www.linkedin.com/posts/cnrs-lebanon-173078239_comparative-overview-of-destroyed-and-damaged-activity-7467828522359717889-HMUj?utm_source=social_share_send&utm_medium=member_desktop_web&rcm=ACoAAB3zA1wBWEJbX9ZTgbFDmJg2ZvKBSWZkkAQ

¹⁴ <https://shorturl.at/WOJW4>

or damaged between October 2023 and March 1, 2026¹⁵. **This brings the total number of completely or partially destroyed residential buildings since 2023 to 308,371.**

Oxfam and Partners' Work

Oxfam has operations across many areas in southern Lebanon currently impacted by occupation, recurrent attacks, or forced displacement orders, including a humanitarian response set up during the previous escalation in 2024.

More than a month after the ceasefire agreement, **Oxfam cannot access 29 water facilities where work was in process, planned, or finalized.** Activities include, among many others:

- Seven solarization installments for water pumping stations
- The rehabilitation, repair, or installation of three water networks.
- The rehabilitation of three water reservoirs.
- The rehabilitation or establishment of six water points.
- The provision of generators for three water pumping stations.

Oxfam was working with four partners in the South and Nabatieh governorates across a range of sectors, including protection, WASH, basic assistance, and other sectors. All four of now have community centers or facilities that have become inaccessible, even after the ceasefire agreement, due to the high rate of Israeli attacks and continued occupation. In addition, many had to cancel ongoing activities in southern areas due to these conditions.

Najdeh, Oxfam's partner organization, lost access to communities it was working with in the city of Tyre, while beneficiaries of their projects also reported inability to access Najdeh's centers outside the city. **More than a month after the ceasefire agreement, Najdeh lost access to almost 5,000 households or less for protection services.**

Nabad, another Oxfam partner, highly engaged in protection and basic assistance activities, still does not have access to its center in the South Governorate, while their Nabatieh Governorate center is only partially open after the ceasefire agreement, with minimal movement. Activities previously closer to the border (in Nabatieh and south of the Zahrani river) mainly shifted northwards with internally displaced persons towards the cities of Saida

¹⁵ <https://shorturl.at/WOJW4>

and Jezzine. **Nabad has lost access to 5,000 individuals more than a month after the ceasefire agreement.**

ABAAD, a partner of Oxfam active in protection, MHPSS, and GBV, lost access to a community center in the city of Tyre and have now suspended activities within areas they had extensive presence in, due to the ongoing occupation and attacks. ABAAD also had many of their own staff members displaced, but continue to operate from their new areas of residence. **The organization noted that more than a month after the April ceasefire agreement, they cannot reach approximately 1,200 internally displaced persons.**

Nabaa, another Oxfam partner leading WASH and basic assistance interventions in four districts, lost access to their areas of operation since early March 2026, until the time of writing. The organization mentioned that they're also reducing the number of people gathered in one shelter, particularly where many children are present due to fears that a strike on a crowded site could cause too many casualties among children, given the recurrent pattern of strikes on civilian areas. A religious center, located next to Nabaa's development center (30 meters away), was hit by an Israeli strike, notably damaging the center. **Nabaa lost access to 128 individuals who had previously been receiving services or had been followed up on through programming since the escalation. Approximately 65% of these individuals are Syrian nationals, and the organization has not been able to verify whether they have returned to Syria or relocated elsewhere.**

Surveillance, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Rights Violations

While Israeli military operations and attacks after the ceasefire agreement were concentrated in southern Lebanese areas, other practices that have grave consequences for civilians in Lebanon and prospects of a sustained end to hostilities have continued.

Among these violations, surveillance and digital intelligence-gathering activities appear to have gone beyond mere reconnaissance to becoming a main element of everyday life in Lebanon, one characterized by the constant buzzing sound of Israeli drones across the country. At the same time, the Israeli army has deployed digital surveillance means which, along with drones, breach a plurality of sovereignty, personal privacy, and civilian protection boundaries.

Drones and Data Gathered

Oxfam spoke to SMEX, a non-profit advocating for advancing human rights in digital spaces across Southwest Asia and North Africa, where the organization highlighted key breaches of basic rights and sovereignty by Israel in Lebanon. Below are some of the hostilities highlighted

Drones in Lebanon are potentially able to take footage, gather electronic signals, recognize Wi-Fi networks and Global System for Mobile Communications (GSMs used by mobile devices). Such surveillance allows Israeli forces access to personal car and driver information, which often explains why Israeli forced displacement orders are usually accompanied with arrow specifying the route people should take when evacuating. This raises concerns about how evacuation routes and forced displacement orders are monitored and enforced, and the depth of personal data collected for people on the road.

The Israeli army potentially deploys the use of IMSI-catchers and “fake” mobile towers for mobile devices, which allows the Israeli army to collect people’s data, at least non-encrypted data, and intercept mobile traffic and track user locations. These activities also reveal people’s MAC Address, their IP address, and many other types of data if the phone is connected to a mobile network.

Among the tools that the Israeli army potentially uses is a range of artificial intelligence tools in its regular activities, including The Gospel, Lavender, and Where’s Daddy, an AI-based target-creation platform, and others that allow them to monitor mass movements. Importantly, such technology, often set up by private Israeli companies, is not only being used by Israeli forces in Lebanon, but ¹⁶is also exported to other country contexts.

Alongside such tactics, Israeli forces, through the presence of numerous antennas and radars near the border with Lebanon, could be related to the deployment of eavesdropping tools on both mobile network-based calls and fixed-line calls. The expanding occupation in southern Lebanon is expected to pave the way for further use of these tools. These practices should not be treated in isolation: military positions, satellite imagery, digital surveillance, drones, and communication interception form one ecosystem of control and monitoring.

The Israeli army also potentially deploys a range of spy tools, using spyware that grants access to internal user data, such as messages, emails, cameras, microphones, and location data in what is known as “zero-click” spyware, meaning that the user does not even need to press any button for the infiltrator to gain access to this data. Spyware methodologies have potentially gone beyond direct device data and can now access data

¹⁶ The deployment of such technology, itself, raises a range of concerns regarding civilian protection, accountability, and broader IHL principles.

between the device and the person's cloud storage, meaning that even if people replace their device, their cloud storage is still compromised, in addition to "social media listening", or the monitoring of people's data on big social media platforms. "They consider us a laboratory, similar to what they did in Gaza and the West Bank," - SMEX interview.

Adding to the precarity of Lebanon's digital security landscape, Lebanese government institutions do not run on a unified software and electronic system, with each ministry or center using their own systems and coordination largely absent, making them more prone for recurrent hacking incidents.

Drones and Everyday Civilian Life

"In [Beirut](#), the drones' hum is no longer a fleeting auditory detail in the periphery of daily life; it has become a constant presence, reshaping the relationship between residents, the city and the sky itself.... War, in this capital city, is not merely confined to the climax of explosion or the spectacle of visible ruins; it is endured as a perpetual soundscape – a low, unbroken hum that lingers to remind people that the space above is no longer neutral, but has been integrated into a system of surveillance and imminent threat.

" – Fida Mikdashi in the Independent¹⁷.

Among the most visible and quintessential signs of continued breaches of Lebanese airspace and sovereignty is the constant presence of Israeli drones and aircraft over the country.

The presence of drones with high-pitched buzzing sounds can have serious psychological effects on populations, causing fear, stress, and anxiety and can amplify cases of post-traumatic stress disorder, especially in conflict settings¹⁸. The strong psychological impact of drone presence has been proven through research and case studies across various contexts, leading to the rise of terms such as "drone-induced anxiety"¹⁹. Reports from Gaza

¹⁷ https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/beirut-israel-idf-drones-surveillance-b2959977.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawRUkdleHRuA2FlbQlxMABicmlkETFUanp3VG9Kbkp4UXREZU9oc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjlyMDM5MTc4ODlwMDg5MgABHtmYWQFuvOktUfUXEdVS6JszTgrkyh59V2zkT54Y8QiPrCSpnfVIdfX_5gSH_aem_ExbfNZKAQSG3cozw3Tj34Q

¹⁸ <https://www.icrc.org/en/article/faq-international-humanitarian-law-drones-armed-conflict>

¹⁹ <https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/how-the-sound-of-drones-inflicts-psychological-trauma-in-ukraine/>

have also documented the use of quadcopters in ways intended to cause distress, fear, and panic among civilians²⁰.

The Impact of Drones and Displacement on Mental Health

Oxfam interviewed Embrace, an organization dedicated to mental health in Lebanon, to better understand of the impact of continued violations on the population in Lebanon's mental health prospects.

“The psychological impact of drones comes partly from the sound itself, and partly from what this sound has become associated with over time,” explained Peter Wanna, a psychotherapist at the Embrace Mental Health Center. “The sound is scary, because it is associated with death or loss, or danger itself. For some people, it triggers areas in the brain that detect threat... then the stress response becomes activated and chronic over time because the sound of the drone is always present, leading to mental health issues.”

“Chronic threat exposure in war environments shows that these unpredictable auditory stimuli can maintain hyper-vigilance and anticipatory anxiety. This, eventually, leads to elevated anxiety, disturbances, emotional dysregulation...”

“For children, it’s also significant developmentally,” adds Wanna. “Children heavily rely on environmental predictability to build a baseline of safety. And this chronic exposure to threatening sounds can interfere with emotional regulation, sleep, concentration. So, we’re looking at a future that is quite devastating for the upcoming generation. We are concerned about increased vulnerability to severe mental health difficulties among future generations.”

Organizations such as Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor have raised concerns about the use of such drones to broadcast sounds to intimidate civilian populations and the potential legal implications of such activities, describing Israeli army strategies as part of a “systematic pattern of psychological violence”²¹.

Drones are not the only type of auditory violence that the Lebanese population is subjected to, as the Israeli forces have also employed a range of other activities that cause

²⁰ <https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/6747/Israel-intensifies-use-of-quadcopters-to-terrorise-and-target-civilians-in-Gaza,-with-terrifying-sounds-and-home-invasions>

²¹ <https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/6747/Israel-intensifies-use-of-quadcopters-to-terrorise-and-target-civilians-in-Gaza,-with-terrifying-sounds-and-home-invasions>

psychological impacts, including the use of sonic booms²². This, too, has been widely documented, and described under the wider umbrella of “auditory warfare”²³.

On social media, Israeli forces recurrently run campaigns and advertisements in Arabic targeted at the Lebanese population with political messaging.

“By itself, this surveillance-related violation intrudes on psychological privacy and safety. This leads to heightened vigilance, distrust, cognitive pre-occupation, and persistent environmental scanning. The nervous system shifts towards threat-monitoring mode. We’re not shifting towards restorative functioning. This digital intrusion blurs the boundary between war and our personal lives. Home spaces often function as a psychological refuge... and right now it’s not safe. Safety has become unclear for us...” – Wanna.

Adding the lens of continued displacement, the situation becomes more precarious for children. Concurrently, and with around one million individuals still displaced across Lebanon, displacement-related psychological harm has already taken shape.

One issue is how children relate to safety, proximity, and exploration of space, which is often taken from their parents: “When you take that from them, nothing feels safe from them. Space, no matter where it is, is dangerous, nowhere is safe”.

With time, long-term displacement and continued instability may contribute to increased vulnerability to a range of mental health difficulties, including emotional dysregulation, personality-related adaptations, and mood-, trauma-, and anxiety-related disorders, depending on a multitude of interacting risk factors, both genetic and environmental.

Accordingly, children, especially those in the early developmental stages of their cognitive, mental, and physical attributes, are particularly vulnerable. This goes alongside the long-term impacts of the war on the opening and closure of schools, the interruption of in-person learning, and the absence of safe social interaction.

A Continued Path of Violence: Inflammatory Rhetoric by Israeli Officials

²² A sonic boom is when a plane breaches the speed of sound, with the resulting impact being a loud sound similar to an explosion or a boom in the sky.

²³ <https://catalystmcgill.com/echoes-of-conflict-how-sonic-warfare-reverberates-through-lebanon/>

Conditions of war or peace are not only impacted by security and material considerations from parties involved, but also by the type and intensity of discourses propagated within relevant contexts.

Among the key drivers of instability in Lebanon, and relatedly in the region, inflammatory and expansionist statements by Israeli officials and military personnel undermine peacebuilding and de-escalation efforts, contributing to further tensions and concerns of continued warfare for populations in the region.

“We are staying in Lebanon in a reinforced security zone. [These are] the five points that existed before the ‘Lion’s Roar’. This is a security zone that starts at the sea and continues to Mount Dov and the Hermon foothills, up to the Syrian border. A security zone ten kilometers thick which is much stronger, much more robust, much more continuous, and much more solid than what we had before. That’s where we are, and we are not leaving” – Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a speech on April 16, 2026.

Netanyahu’s statement appears to signal an intention to maintain or expand Israeli military presence in Lebanese territory, which raises severe concerns regarding prolonged occupation of Lebanese territory, would prevent hundreds of thousands of people from returning to their homes and communities in southern Lebanon. Any prolonged peace process and an end to hostilities must begin with the parties’ willingness to respect territorial sovereignty; otherwise, cycles of violence are likely to continue.

“[My son] asks me all the time not to finish his work and leave him something to do in Lebanon. I tell him, don’t worry, it’ll be enough for everyone,” – Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich in an interview on April 29, 2026.

Such a statement raises serious concerns that senior officials are normalizing or encouraging continued violence and destruction. Dangerously, the statement appears to normalize prolonged and even inter-generational violence. Such rhetoric undermines any prospects for long-term peacebuilding or de-escalation, and contributes to a discourse of hate and willingness to inflict widespread destruction against the country and its people.

Any attempt to instill a solid and permanent end to hostilities must also address the underlying discursive environment, the political rhetoric, and stated intentions of parties to the conflict. Inflammatory statements that encourage or normalize further destruction/violence play an extremely destructive role for any attempt for long-term peacebuilding, and actors with influence must use all forms of pressure and leverage to tone down the severity of political rhetorics.

What Can Be Done?

On a political front, a lot remains to be done internationally and regionally to ensure that violations of international humanitarian law and daily attacks or other hostile acts are brought to an end. **The first and foremost priority is for all parties to the conflict to stop military operations and stop violations of international humanitarian law, and for Israeli forces to withdraw from occupied Lebanese territories and allow the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of displaced communities.** Beyond that, there remain a number of actionable steps that can be taken by actors relevant to the war.

For the Lebanese Government and Parties Involved in Ceasefire Negotiations:

While ceasefire negotiations resume, there remains a lack of a unified strategic framework guiding Lebanon's engagement in negotiations. Initiatives by the government remain fragmented and on an ad hoc basis, rather than based on a unified recovery and ceasefire strategy to end the war. There also remains a stark absence of transparency regarding the main tenets of the ceasefire agreement, and people in Lebanon have a right to know what the current agreement stipulates beyond general conditions, under which harm and destruction have thus far continued.

In the short-term, the Lebanese government can take several concrete steps to strengthen accountability for past and ongoing violations of international humanitarian law (IHL).

These include, among others, documenting Israeli violations and raising them to appropriate multilateral institutions, intensifying diplomatic efforts to end hostilities, and uphold the rights of affected civilians in Lebanon, and making sure political processes are transparently communicated to the public.

Throughout the last few years, Lebanon's ability to access pathways for accountability has been hindered by pre-existing positional deficiencies and the absence of strategic planning, particularly on the level of legal action to be led. To close the impunity gap, Lebanon should ratify the Rome Statute and become a full member of the International Criminal Court, allowing it to refer the situation on its territory to the court. Lebanon could also consider ratifying the Enmod Convention as part of broader efforts to address environmental harm linked to conflict.

On the level of digital protection, surveillance, and rights for the Lebanese public, relevant Lebanese public administrations should conduct high-level auditing, evaluation, and assessment of artificial intelligence and other digital technologies before introducing them

to public offices, given the potential risks involved for government institutions and the general Lebanese public. Lebanon could draw on emerging international approaches to assess and mitigate risks associated with high-risk digital technologies, and to selectively choose which technologies to adopt and allow entry.

Oxfam's interview with SMEX pointed to several key changes that can take place to systematize digital security and rights attainment in Lebanon.

- First, Lebanon launched a cybersecurity strategy in 2018, but it has not been fully implemented. A first step could be to revisit this strategy, update it, account for new dangers related to cybersecurity across the country, and efficiently implement it. The strategy was initially presented as a reform during the Cedars conference for Lebanon, but was eventually not implemented. The absence of concrete implementation risks undermines public confidence and international support for cybersecurity reforms.
- Second, there should be a unified approach and unified standards for public administrations in their digital governance and protection.
- Third, public institutions should strengthen staff capacity by employing specialized cybersecurity and digital protection personnel and systematizing the presence of cybersecurity teams, as opposed to sporadic hiring.
- Fourth, the Lebanese state could file complaints at international organizations, including the International Telecommunication Union which Lebanon is a member of, regarding the reported digital and communication-related violations by Israel.
- Fifth, there should be clear standards regarding access, protection, and security of major mobile operators and networks in Lebanon, including leading telecom companies Touch and Alpha, and Ogero which provides infrastructure for telecom networks in the country²⁴.

Finally, governance of cybersecurity and digital rights in Lebanon remains the chief umbrella under which such steps should be taken. This includes enshrining clear accountability and

²⁴ Lebanon's political economy trajectory of privatizing public services over the last decades has come with a range of security and economic concerns and warrants its own study.

mitigation measures, risk management processes, pathways to address dangers, and prevention measures.

Donors Active in Lebanon

It is essential for donors to ensure that Lebanon does not become a forgotten crisis, as humanitarian needs remain extremely high and socioeconomic conditions continue to deteriorate.

More particularly, the impacts of these back-to-back wars have been disproportionately felt by people in vulnerable situations across the country. As a result, donors should ensure that short-term support for displaced and impacted people is linked to long-term recovery processes by supporting nexus projects that link development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding efforts.

Governments, and Particularly Those with High Influence in Issues in the Region:

It remains deeply problematic that despite years of ongoing attacks across numerous countries in the region, some states continue to provide arms, military support and technological cooperation to Israel, despite the clear risk that such support may be used in serious violations of international humanitarian law. As such, all governments must immediately halt arms transfers and military support to Israel. This includes advanced technological systems with dual use.

Furthermore, rhetorical condemnations have proven insufficient to change the Israeli government's conduct. States should take concrete, lawful measures to press Israel to end hostilities and comply with international law.

Beyond state-level action remains the need to ensure accountability for individuals who incite, order, facilitate, advocate, or otherwise contribute to further violence, occupation, harm to civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, and other serious violations of international law. Available public evidence should be assessed by states as a basis for targeted measures, including sanctions where legal thresholds are met.

Finally, and on a key note, it remains a responsibility for all those that are involved in and care about the world's international humanitarian landscape and international accountability pathways to ensure legal accountability for all those responsible for alleged serious violations of IHL and other international law in Lebanon and the region.